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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No,

900307 CA

DONALD KITCHEN,
Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of right made pursuant to Title 77, Part
35, Section 26 of the Utah Code and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals.

This court has appellate jurisdiction in

this case pursuant to Title 28, Part 2a, Section 5(2) of the Utah
Code.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction of the
second

degree

felony

offense

substance, cocaine, with

of

possession

intent to distribute

of

a

controlled

entered

in the

Fourth District Court in and for Juab County following a bench
trial before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, District Judge.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
POINT

I:

Whether

all motorists

it is "unreasonable" to stop and detain

at a roadblock because Utah statutes limit the

authority of officers to stop persons either for the purpose of
checking driver's licenses and vehicle safety or to investigate
possible criminal violations to situations where the officer has
reasonable suspicion that a violation has occurred.
POINT II:

Whether

roadblocks

are

per

se

unconstitutional

under Section 14, Article I, of the Constitution of Utah.
POINT III:

In the alternative, whether the roadblock in this

case violated the state and federal constitutions because it was
not

conducted

policy

pursuant

making

to

officials

standards
in

which

response

to

were
a

developed

by

particularized,

justifying, public need and which minimized the discretion of
officers

in

the

field

and

the

intrusion

upon

rights

of the

public.
POINT IV:

Whether the warrant clause of Section 14, Article

I of the Constitution of Utah prohibits a warrantless search of
luggage in a vehicle where there is no evidence that delay to get
a warrant would endanger the officers or evidence.

2

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTE

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Section 14, Article I of the Constitution of Utah provide:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Section 41-1-17, Utah Code Annotated, provides in relevant
part:
Department
provisions.

and

officers

to

enforce

The commission, and such officers and
inspectors of the department as it shall
designate, peace officers, state patrolmen,
and others duly authorized by the department
or by law shall have power and it shall be
their duty:

(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief that
any vehicle is being operated in violation of
any provision of this act or of any other law
regulating the operation of vehicles to
require the driver thereof to stop, exhibit
his driver's license and the registration
card issued for the vehicles and submit to an
inspection of such vehicle, the registration
plates and registration card thereon.
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The appellant, Donald Kitchen, was charged by
with

the

second

degree

felony

of

possession

of

information
cocaine,

a

controlled substance, with intent to distribute in violation of
Section 58-37-l(a), Utah Code.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition
Prior to trial, appellant made a motion to suppress all
evidence seized by law enforcement officers as a result of the
detention of the appellant

at a roadblock and the subsequent

searches of his automobile for the reason that the detention and
searches were in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Constitution
of Utah.

(R-9) .

An evidentiary hearing was held at which the

facts surrounding the implementation of a roadblock on 1-15 in
Juab County, the detention of appellant at that roadblock and the
subsequent searches of the appellant's vehicle, were developed.
Following briefing by the parties, the district court filed a
Ruling setting out its findings and conclusions and denying the
motion to suppress.

(R-26-36).

The appellant waived his right to jury trial and matter was
4

submitted
parties

to the district
that

the

court

court upon
make

a

the

stipulation

determination

of

of the

guilt

or

innocence based upon the evidence submitted

at the motion to

suppress.

court

Based

appellant guilty.
Following

the

upon

that

evidence,

the

found

the

(Hearing Transcript, May 8, 1990).
preparation

of

a pre-sentence

report, the

appellant was sentenced to pay a fine and serve a prison sentence
which was suspended upon the condition that the appellant serve
120 days in jail and submit to other conditions of probation.
The district court issued a Certificate of Probable Cause and
Stay staying the sentence pending this appeal.

(R-48).

The final, written Judgment was filed on June 21, 1990.
54).

The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 5, 1990

(R-

(R-44) ,

immediately following the imposition of sentence in open court.
Relevant Facts
The

evidence

supporting

the

appellant's

conviction

was

obtained as a result of the seizure of the appellant and the
search of his vehicle by law enforcement officers at a roadblock
on 1-15

in Juab County on May

established
Paul

under

Mangelson

in

the

17, 1989.

supervision

connection

with

The roadblock was

of Highway
a

Patrol

"criminal

interdiction"

class which Sergeant Mangelson was teaching to local law
5

Sergeant

enforcement officers, and which, according to Sergeant Mangelson,
involved:
Teaching them techniques of getting into
vehicles.
Certain things that indicate
contraband in the vehicles what have you.
(Transcript, Suppression Hearing at pp. 5, 6, 17, 18 [Hereinafter
T-

]).

However, Sergeant Mangelson testified that the purpose

of the roadblock itself was a safety check of equipment and
driver's licenses.

(T-41-42).

Sergeant Mangelson was teaching

officers what things to look for which might indicate illegal
activity, in the routine course of duty rather than teaching them
how to conduct a roadblock.

(T-42).

Apparently, the roadblock

served the function of providing a large number of motorists upon
which to demonstrate and practice these skills.
Neither the Department of Motor Vehicles nor the Highway
Patrol have any regulations on how to conduct roadblocks.
18-19) .

(T-

The plan for conducting the roadblock was devised by

Sergeant Mangelson and approved by his supervisor, Lieutenant
Utley.

(T-19).

The location in Juab County was selected because

of the traffic conditions there.

(T-19).

Traffic in both

directions was intercepted and commercial traffic was diverted
around the roadblock while all other traffic was directed into a
lane delineated by orange cones to wait to talk to officers.
6

An

officer

would

request

the

driver's

license

and

vehicle

registration and look over the vehicle, and, occupants and if
there were any problem, the vehicle would be directed to the side
of the road for further investigation.
Orange

signs

similar

to

(T-8).

those

used

to

warn

of

road

construction were placed along the approach to the roadblock,
the first showing the symbol of a flag man, the second stating
"Prepare to Stop" and the third stating "All Traffic Must Stop."
(T-22) .

The

first

sign was positioned

advance of the roadblock.

(T-24).

one

quarter mile

in

The roadblock was positioned

so that motorists could not avoid it by exiting the interstate
and officers were stationed to pursue anyone, even a passenger,
who attempted to avoid the roadblock.

(T-25).

officers were involved in the operation.

Approximately 35

(T-6).

A notice that the Highway Patrol would conduct roadblocks
in Juab County in the summer months had been published in the
Daily Herald of Orem on May 2, 1989 and the Times News of Juab
County on May 3, 1989.

(T-19-22).

Sergeant Mangelson testified

that only a small percentage of the people stopped were from the
circulation
likelihood

area
of

of

anyone

those

newspapers

traveling

that

direction

the
the

interstate highway having read the local papers was remote.

(T-

7

either

and

on

37) .

in

(T-21)

At

about

11:00

passenger, Daniel

a.m.,1

the

appellant,

accompanied

Burke, drove up to the roadblock.

by

a

(T-2 6).

They were diverted into the area delineated by orange cones and
waited for at least five or ten minutes (T-69-86) behind four to
eight

cars which were

in line ahead of them

(T-73-91) until

Officer John Lloyd approached and requested appellant's driver's
license
produced.
Mr.
Officer

and

vehicle

registration

(T-9),

which

the

appellant

(T-28).
Burke

testified

Lloyd,

Sergeant

that while appellant was talking to
Mangelson,

who

was

walking

along

observing the cars in line ahead of them (T-75) , walked around
the front of their car and opened the passenger door requesting
identification from Mr. Burke.

(T-63) .

Mr. Burke gave him his

driver's license and answered questions about his destination.
Sergeant Mangelson asked if they had any drugs or money and Mr.
Burke said "no."

Sergeant Mangelson then said, "Well, then you

don't mind if we look around."

Mr. Burke deferred to appellant

who indicated that he would not consent to a search.

(T-65).

Sergeant Mangelson responded by ordering appellant to pull the
car over on the shoulder of the road and then ordered Mr. Burke
out of the car.

Sergeant Mangelson then leaned into the car and

1

The roadblock began
maintained until noon. Ibid.

at
8

7:00

a.m.

and

was

to

be

appeared to look around after which he turned and asked Mr. Burke
if he "smoked a little grass."

Mr. Burke said "no" and Sergeant

Mangelson said "you might as well give it to me because I know
you have it."

Mr. Burke denied having any and held up his arms

while Sergeant Mangelson "frisked" him without result.

Sergeant

Mangelson then went back to searching the car (T-66) and, after
Sergeant Mangelson apparently located some contraband, Mr. Burke
heard him arrest appellant, who was still in the car, and then
instructed another officer to arrest Mr. Burke.

(T-67).

Mr. Burke testified that after he was arrested he stood by
the line of vehicles and observed that older people were waived
through

the

license.

roadblock without

(T-68).

having to produce

a driver's

Other cars were searched "a little bit" and

the car behind appellant's, which was occupied by a young couple,
was searched by officers including suit cases which were in the
truck, apparently without incriminating result because the young
couple was allowed to leave.

(T-68).

The appellant gave testimony similar to Mr. Burke.

He

testified that he was approached at the roadblock by an officer
who asked for his driver's license and registration which he
produced.

There ensued a conversation about his destination and

his permission to drive the car which was his mother's.

The

officer then asked another officer if it was allright to let them
9

go.

At that time the passenger door was opened, surprising the

passenger who was leaning on it.
After

the

conversation

Mangelson,

the

Sergeant

vehicle.

(T-86-87).

between

asked

for

Mr.

Burke

permission

and
to

search

the

When appellant refused, Sergeant Mangelson ordered him

to pull his car over to the shoulder of the highway.
Mangelson

Sergeant

then

leaned

into

the

car

and

through the console between the seats.

commenced

(T-88).

Sergeant
to

search

At that point,

Sergeant Mangelson told appellant that he smelled Marijuana and
that he wanted it produced to save everyone time and trouble.
The appellant pulled a small quantity of Marijuana out of the
console "Because he was searching there anyway . . .
would be a lot nicer if I gave it to him.11
Officer

John

Lloyd,

the

officer

I thought he

(T-89) .
who

first

approached

appellant and requested his driver's license, did not testify.
Sergeant Mangelson testified that he was standing behind Officer
Lloyd while Lloyd talked to appellant and could detect a strong
odor

of

burnt

Marijuana

coming

from

the

vehicle.

(T-9).

Sergeant Mangelson then walked around the car to the passenger
side and asked if there were Marijuana in the vehicle and was
told there was not.

Sergeant Mangelson asked if he could look

around the vehicle and when he was refused, ordered the vehicle
to the side of the road.

Sergeant Mangelson testified he ordered
10

the passenger out of the vehicle and announced that he could
smell Marijuana and they might as well give it to him.

Appellant

produced two baggies that appeared to contain about a quarter
ounce of Marijuana.

(T-10, 16).

While Sergeant Mangelson's

testimony conflicted with that of appellant and Mr. Burke in that
he claimed he requested

and received

the Marijuana before he

started to search, he also testified that he had decided he would
search and made that clear to appellant at the time he told him
to produce it and "save us a lot of time and trouble."

(T-30-

32) .
Sergeant

Mangelson

testified

that he noticed

appellant's shirt pocket and asked what it was.

a bulge in

The appellant,

who appeared to be very nervous, replied it was money and when
asked how much said, "$2,000.00", explaining he was going to Las
Vegas to gamble.

Appellant, at the Sergeantfs request, produced

the bundle and Sergeant Mangelson counted $1,000.00 of it and
concluded that there was a lot more than $2,000.00.

(T-ll).

Sergeant Mangelson then discovered a small vial with white
powder, which

appeared

to him to be cocaine, in the console

between the car seats (T-12), and formally placed appellant and
Mr. Burke under arrest.

Searching the car further, the officers

located seven baggies, containing what was later determined to be
a total of 27 ounces of cocaine, in one of three suit cases in
11

the back of the vehicle.

(T-13).

In a later search, officers discovered a small vial, containing the remnants of Marijuana cigarettes, in a pouch in the
passenger door of the vehicle.

(T-14).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The probable cause for the searches which produced the
incriminating evidence in this case derived directly from the
initial seizure of the person and automobile of the appellant at
the

roadblock

established

by

field

officers

of the Highway

Patrol.
Point

I.

This seizure was in violation of both Section

14, Article I of the Utah Constitution and the United States
Constitution

because

limited

authority

the

the
of

Utah
law

Legislature
enforcement

has

specifically

officers

to

stop

motorists for purposes of checking driver's licenses and safety
inspections and for purposes of investigating criminal activity
to situations where the officer has a reasonable belief a vehicle
is being operated in violation of law or reasonable suspicion
that a public offense is, has been or will be committed.
Point

II.

Regardless

of

the

question

of

statutory

authority, the Utah Constitution prohibits seizures of the person
in the absence of particularized suspicion, rendering roadblocks
12

per se unconstitutional.
J

j-i*.value

The Utah Constitution provides more

i * v * ri

privac

*.: .e * '

* r.<- jiuueu States Constitution.

The

- state *-o state, and Utah's unique

history and culture has resulted in a higher degree of protection
of pri vacy and 1 ibert} thai i the
national constitution.
history

and

culture

prohi bi ts roadt ""*
Point III.

:vei mandated by the

Idaho, the state w ;*b +-he most similar
<.

and

identically

.s
',. ternativei .

roadb1ock i n th i s c , «

worded

constitution,

• . . - 91::i tut ional ,

the Utah Constitutior . .1 :

- ;.-

:

* -•-.;

* roadblocks are permitted under

, • legislation

-

- * * -equired. the

onethe1ess uncons11tutional because

' conducted pursuant to standards, which were developed

c; "\d enforced

by

pcirticui •. - .-red
discretion

policy
and

making

justifying

officials
need

and

::• response
wnxcxi

to

a:i 1

minimized

the

i>f 'the officers in the fi eld and the intrusion upon

privacy and liberty of the traveling public.
Point IV

Reqard ] ess of the legal ity of the Initial seizure

and search, and assuming the existence of probable
warrantless search of appellant's suitcase
vehicle

was

in

violation

01

Section

14,

. aazse

; - * ::<.* 1
Article

1 U

tne
h;,,
true

Constitution of Utah because the warrant clause requires that a
warrant be obtained unless the state proves that the ensuming
delay would have endangered the officers or the integrity of the
13

evidence •

The search of the suitcase did not occur until after

the vehicle and its occupants were securely in the custody of the
many officers at the scene.

The search of the suitcase was not

claimed to be an inventory search, nor could it have been,
because

the

opening

of

containers

is

not

constitutionally

permitted in the absence of a standardized procedure mandating
the opening of all containers whenever a vehicle is impounded.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The evidence upon which the appellant was convicted was all
seized during the searches of the appellant's vehicle at the
roadblock and later at an impound lot. The district court found,
Ruling (R-33), that the probable cause for these searches was
that Sergeant Mangelson could smell the odor of Marijuana coming
from the car while appellant was talking to Officer Lloyd through
the driver's window.

However, it is elementary that probable

cause, and even reasonable suspicion for a seizure, cannot be
based upon an olfaction made during, and as a exploitation of, an
illegal detention.
1217

See, e.g., State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214,

(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Therefore, the validity of the

searches and the conviction based upon the fruits of those
searches turns upon the validity of the initial seizure of
14

appellant at the roadblock.

There can be no question but that

even a momentary, intentional stop by a law enforcement officer
at a checkpoint constitutes a "seizure" within the constitutional
meaning.

See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 58

L.W. 4781, 4783 (June 14, 1990).
Appellant will here follow the outline suggested in Davis
and Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the Constitutionality of
Sobriety Roadblock Stops in Utah, 3 BYU J. PUB. L. 357, (1989),
beginning
authority

with

the

(which

question
appellant

of

whether

believes

there
is

is

statutory

dispositive)

and

proceeding in the alternative, to whether the Utah Constitution
prohibits roadblocks and then, again alternatively, whether this
roadblock was planned and conducted in a constitutional manner.
POINT I. R O . A D B L O C K
STOPS
ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE UTAH STATUTES LIMIT
THE AUTHORITY OF OFFICERS TO DETAIN TO
SITUATIONS WHERE THE OFFICER HAS REASONABLE
AND INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION OF VIOLATION OF
LAW.
As Davis and Wallentine, supra, stress, the first question
to be resolved is the question whether the legislature has
granted authority to officers to stop motorists at roadblocks:
In order to be constitutional a roadblock
must be premised upon state statutory
authority, either explicit or implicit.
Without such authority the roadblock is per
15

se unconstitutional.
3 BYU J. PUB, L. at 360.

The United States Supreme Court held in

Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72
that

while

authorized

Congress
a

clearly

forcible

entry

could
to

have

inspect

(1970),

constitutionally

a

licensed

liquor

establishment without a warrant, Congress had not done so and
therefore
Oregon

such

Supreme

an

entry

Court

violated

likewise

the

held

Fourth
that

Amendment.

a

detention

The
at

a

roadblock was in violation of its state constitutional seizure
protections

because

there

was

not

statutory

authority

for

roadblocks and, therefore, the Oregon court found it unnecessary
to determine whether its legislature could have constitutionally
authorized roadblocks.

Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Ore. 97, 743

P.2d 692 (1987); accord, State v. Bovanosky, 304 Ore. 131, 743
P.2d 715 (1987); see also, State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1984); State v. Henderson, 114 Ida. 293, 756 P.2d 1057
(1988) .
The Oregon Supreme Court held that the statutory authority
must be explicit and not implied:
roadblocks are seizures of the
person or the person's effects.
For this
reason, the authority cannot be implied.
Before they search or seize executive
agencies must have explicit authority from
outside the executive branch.
16

743 P.2d at 695.
Davis and Wallentine point out that there is no explicit
statutory

authorization

in

Utah

but

suggest

that

a

Utah

appellate court might find implied authority in general statutes
concerning the duty to enforce laws.

3 BYU J. PUB. L. at 361-63.

The district court, although not addressing this issue in its
written Ruling, stated at the bench trial that it relied upon the
oath officers take to uphold the laws which that court somehow
construed

to

constitute

appropriate roadblocks.

legislative

authority

to

effectuate

Hearing Transcript, May 8, 1990, pp. 3-

4.
The difficulty with the search for implied authority in Utah
legislation, assuming that implied authority is constitutionally
acceptable, is that the Utah Legislature has explicitly limited
the authority
and

of officers to effectuate both "administrative"

"investigatory"

stops.

Sergeant

Mangelson

claimed

the

roadblock was primarily for the purpose of checking for driver's
licenses and vehicle registration and to inspect the vehicle for
safety.
Act

(T-41-42).

The Utah Legislature in the Motor Vehicle

has defined the power of officers to stop motorists and

inspect papers and the vehicle as follows:
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Department and officers to enforce
provisions.
The commission, and such officers and
inspectors of the department as it shall
designate, peace officers, state patrolmen,
and others duly authorized by the department
or by law shall have power and it shall be
their duty:

(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief that
any vehicle is being operated in violation of
any provision of this act or of any under
law regulating the operation of vehicles to
require the driver thereof to stop, exhibit
his driver's license and the registration
card issued for the vehicles and submit to an
inspection of such vehicle, the registration
plates and registration card thereon.
Section 41-1-17, Utah Code.
of

the

authority

(Emphasis added).

to stop and

This limitation

inspect to situations where an

officer has reasonable belief that a particular vehicle is being
operated in violation of law is additionally significant because
of the fact that it is unusual.

Professor LaFave states:

Virtually
all states have adopted
legislation
requiring every motorist to carry his driver's license
while operating a vehicle and to display same upon
demand of a police officer or other designated
official. A representative statute reads as follows:
Every licensee or permittee shall have his
drivers 1Lcense or permit in his immediate
possession at all times when operating a
motor vehicle and, for the purpose of
indicating compliance with the requirement
shall display such license or permit if it is
18

his possession upon demand made, when in
uniform or displaying a badge or other sign
of authority, by a member of the State
Police, a sheriff or other police officer or
designated agent of the Secretary of State.
Similarly, the various jurisdictions have also adopted
legislation requiring motorists to display upon demand
the registration papers for the vehicles they are
driving.
4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, 52, 53 (2d ed. 1987). (Footnotes
omitted).

Thus virtually every other state imposes a duty to

display licenses and registration "upon demand", implying the
right and power of officers to make the demand simply because a
person is operating a vehicle.

Sergeant Mangelson testified that

he believed he was authorized to demand to inspect a driver's
license simply because a person was driving.

(T-23).

This

belief perhaps derives from some universal police lore which may
have validity in virtually all other states but it is simply not
true in Utah.

A Utah driver has no duty to display his license

or submit his vehicle to inspection unless he or she has done
something to raise a belief of wrongdoing.
The United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, 44 0
U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, (1979), while holding
that random spot checks for purposes of checking licenses was a
violation of the fourth amendment suggested in dictum that the
states might develop less intrusive methods of checking driver's
licenses such as stopping all traffic at a roadblock.
19

440 U.S.

at 664.

However, while the Utah Legislature might authorize a

roadblock for checking

licenses without violating the Fourth

Amendment, it has not done so, and, in legislation on the
particular

subject

of

driver's

license

display

and

vehicle

inspection, it has limited the officer's right to stop to where
he has a reasonable belief that a violation has occurred.
The question of whether the Utah Constitution would permit
legislation

authorizing

the

stopping

of

all

traffic

at

a

roadblock is discussed, infra, but the question is moot since the
legislature has considered the question of how much authority to
grant officers to stop vehicles for this purpose and chosen to
limit it.
The secondary purpose of the roadblock was to observe for
signs of other law violations.

The Utah Legislature has also

addressed the authority of officers to stop and detain persons
for this purpose:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
Section 77-7-15, Utah Code Ann.

This court has said that:

"Section 77-7-15 is the statutory codification for a
20

constitutional stop."

State v. Sierra, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 55,

754 P.2d 972, 975 (Ct. App. 1988).

But, regardless of whether

the statute sets the constitutional standard, it does statutorily
limit the authority a Utah peace officer has to interfere with a
persons

liberty

and privacy

for the purpose of

possible criminal violations.

investigating

An officer's oath to enforce the

law is an oath to act within the statutory law as well, and he
acts unreasonably within the meaning of both the Fourth Amendment
and Section 14, Article I of the Utah Constitution when he seizes
a person and his vehicle without statutory authority.
The balancing of the need to infringe liberty to protect
important government interests with the citizenfs interest in the
freedom

of travel and privacy

should be struck

instance by the legislature.

in the

first

The Utah Legislature has struck

that balance in favor of the citizen's right to go unhampered
about

his

suspicion

business
that

a

absent

some

violation

of

individualized
either

motor

and

reasonable

vehicle

laws

or

criminal laws has occurred.
Since the authority of Utah law enforcement officers to stop
motorists for either the administrative purpose of checking the
driver's license and vehicle safety or the investigative purpose
of observing

for violations of law has been limited, Sergeant

Mangelson and his students acted in violation of the Fourth
21

Amendment

and

Section

14, Article

I

when

they

stopped

and

detained appellant at the roadblock in this case.
POINT II: ROADBLOCKS ARE PROHIBITED
BY SECTION 14, ARTICLE I, OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
This argument is made in the alternative to that made in
Point I of this brief and assumes, contrarily to that argument,
that law enforcement officers have statutory authority to stop
all

motorists

either

to

check

driver's

licenses

and

vehicle

safety or to make observations of possible violations of law.
The appellate courts of Utah have not, as of this date,
ruled

upon

the

validity

of

roadblocks

under

either

Constitution of Utah or the United States Constitution.

the

The Utah

Supreme Court in a recent decision by Justice Durham joined by
Justice

Zimmerman

with

Justice

Stewart

concurring

"in

the

result" has recently applied Section 14, Article I, to protect
the privacy interest in unoccupied automobiles independently from
the

similarly

worded

Fourth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution, quoting with approval the Washington Supreme Court
in State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 439, 688 P.2d 136, 140-41
(1984):
Prior reliance on federal precedent and
federal constitutional provisions [does] not
preclude us from taking a more expansive
22

view of [the state constitution] where the
United States Supreme Court determines to
further limit federal guarantees in a manner
inconsistent with our prior pronouncements.
State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 20 (Sup. Ct. May 20,
1990) .
seizure

Since the Utah Court has decided that the search and
protections

extensive
first

than the

analyze

Constitution.

the
As

of

Section

federal
validity

14, Article

I,

may

be

more

protections, it is appropriate to
of

the Washington

roadblocks
Supreme

under
Court

the

stated

State
in a

similar case:
When parties allege violation of rights
under both the United States and Washington
Constitutions, this court will
first
independently
interpret and apply
the
Washington Constitution in order, among other
concerns, to develop a body of independent
jurisprudence, and because consideration of
the United States Constitution first would be
premature. State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 3 64,
373-74, 679 P.2d 858 (1984).
We find the
sobriety checkpoint program illegal based on
adequate and independent state grounds. Any
federal cases cited are used only for the
purpose of guidance and do not by themselves
compel the result reached.
City of Seattle v. Mesiani. 755 P.2d 775, 776 (Wash. 1988) (en
banc).

See also, State v. Kirk. 493 A.2d 1271 (N.J. Super. 1985)

(State constitution most appropriate to resolve roadblock issue).
The determination of the constitutionality of roadblocks involves
23

the balancing of the governmental interest served by the
roadblock

against

the

intrusion

upon

interest and/or freedom of movement.

the

citizen's

privacy

It would seem apparent that

the value to be placed upon privacy and freedom of movement would
vary from place to place depending on the history and culture of
the

region, making

the

striking

constitutions particularly

of that balance

appropriate.

under

state

It is not surprising

that, while the number of states upholding roadblocks

(whether

under state or federal constitution) slightly outnumbers those
invalidating
culture,

roadblocks, among
a

strong

unconstitutional.
n.3

(Idaho 1988). 2

greater

importance

states

majority

considered

have

"Western"

found

in

roadblocks

See, State v. Henderson, 756 P. 2d 1057, 1062
It is submitted that this follows from the
placed

upon

both

privacy

and

travel

by

automobile in the West.
Idaho, which has much in common historically and culturally
with Utah, has a constitutional provision which is virtually

2

Of the jurisdictions listed in Henderson which have
suppressed evidence from roadblocks six could be considered
Western in culture:
Arizona, South Dakota, Texas, Washington,
Oregon, and Oklahoma. Idaho should be added to this group as a
result of Henderson.
Of the courts listed as upholding
roadblocks, only three are from Western states: Arizona (which
has also ruled the other way), California and New Mexico.
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identical to Section 14, Article I of the Utah Constitution.3
The Idaho Supreme Court interpreted that provision to prohibit a
roadblock, designed to deter and apprehend drunk drivers, which
was approved by the Boise Chief of Police, widely advertised as
to date in advance and conducted similarly to the roadblock in
the instant case.
the

state's

"compelling"

State v. Henderson, supra.

interest
and

in

controlling

stated:

"Protecting

drunk

driving

citizens

threatening danger is a paramount concern".
1060.

That court found
to

from

be

life-

Ibid., 756 P.2d at

However, the Idaho court found from the evidence presented

that roadblocks are inefficient and therefore were an unnecessary
constraint upon a person's right to remain free of search and
seizure absent probable cause.
was also

756 P. 2d at 1060-61.

The court

influenced by the lack of legislative authority for

roadblocks.

756 P. 2d at 1061-62.

However, the Idaho court

seemed most concerned with the fact that roadblocks constitute a
seizure of the person and a search for evidence without any

Article I, §17 of the Idaho Constitution provides:
Unreasonable
searches
and
seizures
prohibited.—The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated and no warrant
shall issue without probable cause shown by
affidavit, particularly describing the place
to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized.
25

individualized suspicion of wrongdoing by the person seized:
Perhaps the most important attribute of
our way of life in Idaho is individual
liberty •
A citizen is free to stroll the
streets, hike the mountains, and float the
rivers of this state without interference
from the government.
That is, police treat
you as a criminal only if your actions
correspond.
Such is not the case with
roadblocks.
756 P. 2d at 1063.
unconstitutional
question

The court went on to hold roadblocks to be

under

of whether

the

state

or not the

constitution
legislature

reserving

might

the

sanction a

method of conducting roadblocks with prior judicial approval:
Accordingly, we hold that where police
lack
express
legislative
authority,
particularized
suspicion
of
criminal
wrongdoing and prior judicial approval,
roadblocks established to apprehend drunk
drivers cannot withstand
constitutional
scrutiny.
Although the United
States
Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
warrantless roadblocks violate the federal
constitution, we base our decision today
solely on art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution.
The Idaho Constitution can,
where appropriate, grant more protection than
its federal counterpart.
756 P.2d at 1063.

(Citation omitted).

Other cases which have held warrantless roadblocks to check
for drunk driving to violate the state constitutions in their
jurisdictions without regard to how the roadblocks are conducted
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or regulated are:

Nelson v. Lane County. 403 Ore. 97, 743 P. 2d

692 (1987); State v. Boyanovskv, 304 Ore. 181, 743 P.2d 711
(1987); Citv of Seattle v. Mesiani. 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d
775 (1988).
While Utah appellate courts have not yet squarely ruled on
the constitutionality
Utah

Adv.

Rep.

of roadblocks, see State v. Talbot, 134

15, n.

4

(Ct. App. May

9,

1990)

there

are

precedents indicating that Utah Courts are at least as sensitive
to the privacy and mobility interests as the courts of Idaho,
Washington and Oregon and raise questions regarding the validity
of roadblocks.

It is significant that the Utah Supreme Court

relied upon the authority

of Washington and Oregon courts in

interpreting the Constitution of Utah as it applied to vehicle
searches in State v. Larocco, supra, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 20.
In State v. Talbot, supra, this court held that the avoidance of
a roadblock by a motorist did not provide reasonable suspicion to
stop and question the motorist.

In so doing the court held that

a person may choose to avoid and not talk to an officer when that
person is in an automobile as well as on foot.

The roadblock in

the instant case was not voluntary—the officers were positioned
to pursue any person who attempted to avoid it, even a passenger
who

might

try

to

walk

away.

(T-25) .

If

it

were

voluntary it would be a "level one" stop and the Fourth
27

wholly

Amendment
apply.

and,

presumably,

Section

14, Article

I, would

not

See, e.g., State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct.

App. 1988) .

As this court indicated in Talbot, 134 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 19, several courts which have validated roadblocks have
taken

into

consideration

the

existence

of

persons to avoid roadblocks if they wish to.
Superior Court. 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d

a

policy

allowing

See, e.g., State v.

1073, 1075

(1984)

(en

banc) (officer would follow evader but not stop unless pursuant
to other violation); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 241
Cal Rptr. 42, 743

P.2d

1299, 1315

(1987)

(sufficient advance

warning given so that motorist could avoid roadblock); Little v.
State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1984) (no action would be
taken if driver chose to avoid roadblock) ; People v. Peil, 122
Misc.

2d

defendant

617, 471 N.Y.S.2d
chosen,

he

could

532, 535
have

(Justice Ct. 1984)

avoided

roadblock

(had

without

recourse by police).
However, where authority and the implicit threat of force
are used to force* a stop and enforce a detention, as was done in
the

instant

case,

the

Utah

appellate

courts

have

uniformly

required at least an articuable, reasonable suspicion that the
person

stopped

has

unlawful activity.

been,

is, or

is

about

to be

engaged

in

E.g., State v. Baird, supra; Sandy City v.

Thorness, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Ct. App. August 18, 1989); State
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v. Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Sup. Ct. 1989) .

The Utah

appellate courts have not recognized an exception to this
requirement nor suggested that the stopping and detaining of all
traffic

vitiates

suspicion

of

the

need

wrongdoing.

for

individualized,

Certainly

the

reasonable

intrusion

on

the

citizen's liberty is not lessened because it is happening to
everyone.
It

is

submitted

that

the

Pennsylvania

Superior

Court

correctly analyzed the situation when after review of the cases,
if stated in Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 502 A.2d 221, 225-26 (Pa.
Super. 1985):
While the arguments supporting the
constitutionality of systematic roadblocks
are persuasive, the rationale supporting them
is flawed. No amount of control or limited
discretion can justify the "seizure" that
takes place in the complete absence of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a
motor vehicle violation has occurred.
Certainly, the Constitution of our
Commonwealth affords its citizens the right
to be free from intrusions where one has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
It

is

suggested

citizens no less.

that

the Constitution

of Utah affords its

Section 14, Article I of the Constitution of

Utah prohibits roadblocks regardless of how they are regulated or
conducted for the reason that they result in a seizure of the
person without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing by the person

detained.
POINT III: ASSUMING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ROADBLOCKS, THIS ROADBLOCK VIOLATED THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SECTION 14, ARTICLE I
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY DEMONSTRATED
NEED NOR PROPERLY REGULATED.
The United States Supreme Court and some state courts have
held or suggested that roadblocks are constitutional if the state
establishes that the public interest in controlling a problem out
weighs the intrusion and the roadblock is properly regulated to
limit the discretion of the officers in the field and to minimize
the

intrusion

upon the rights of motorists.

In Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 440 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), the
Court held
motorists,

it violated
in

the

the Fourth Amendment to randomly stop

absence

of

individualized

suspicion

of

wrongdoing, for the purpose of checking drivers' licenses and
vehicle registration documents.

However, the Court observed:

This holding does not preclude the State
of Delaware or other States from developing
methods for spot checks that involve less
intrusion or that do not involve the
unconstrained exercise of discretion. *
440 U.S. at 664.

In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 58

L.W.

14,

4784

checkpoint

(June
system

1990),

which

had

the
been

Supreme

Court

conducted

evaluated

under

a

procedural

guidelines promulgated by the Director of the Department of State
30

Police to check for signs of intoxication shown by motorists
passing
seconds.

through.

The average delay

for each vehicle was 25

The Court stated:
In sum, the balance of the State's
interest in preventing drunken driving, the
extent to which this system can reasonably be
said to advance that interest, and the degree
of intrusion upon individual motorists who
are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the
state program.
We therefore hold that is
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

58 L.W. at 4784.
Davis

and

Wallentine,

A

Model

for

Analyzing

the

Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops in Utah, 4 BYU J.
PUB. L. 357 (1989), summarizes the Fourth Amendment test for the
validity of the seizure which occurs at roadblock as follows:
The first step considers the gravity of
public concerns served by the seizure as
demonstrated by specific, objective facts.
Second, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public
interest must be
considered.
Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the severity of the intrusion on
individual liberty will be weighed.
3 BYU J. PUB. L. at 374-75. (Emphasis in original).
The record in the instant case is murky at best with regard
to the public concern served by this roadblock.

The district

court found that the roadblock was a continuation of the
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training session and was conducted for the purpose of checking
for drivers licenses; registration, liability insurance, and auto
safety

and

observing

for

any

violation

including alcohol and controlled
Ruling
interest

(R-27).

While

in training

it

the

criminal

substance abuse.

is conceded

officers

of

and

law

Finding 3,

that the state has an

in enforcing motor vehicle

regulations and the criminal law, these concerns are so broad as
to be almost meaningless in the context of applying the first
step

of

evidence

the

constitutional

elicited

as

advance these concerns.

to

test.

how

the

Furthermore, there was
roadblock

was

no

perceived

to

It is submitted that the state failed to

demonstrate either what the particular public concern was or how
the

roadblock

served

that

concern.

The

district

court

was

therefore unable to evaluate those factors to properly determine
if they outweighed the intrusion upon the rights of the motoring
public.

This failure is particularly significant in view of the

fact that the decision to implement the roadblock in the first
place was made by officers in the field rather than by either the
legislature

or

high

executive branch.

level,

policy

making

officials

in

the

In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,

supra, the decision to implement the roadblock was made by the

32

Director of the Michigan Department of State Police4 in response
to

the

particularized

implemented

in

problem

accordance

with

of

drunk

guidelines

driving

and

regulating

was
site

selection, publicity and operations.
One measure of the severity of the intrusion is the amount
of delay caused to the motorists whose journey is interrupted.
The average delay in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,
supra, was 25 seconds, 58 L.W. 4782, Davis and Wallentine, supra,
observe that n[m]ost roadblocks require only a few minutes time"
and note case examples of fifteen to thirty seconds, five to
twenty seconds; and two to three minutes.
378-79, n. 124.

3 BYU J. PUB. L. at

Appellant and his passenger were detained in

line for ten minutes before talking to the first officer.
69) .

(T-

The motorists who were not waived through or further

detained because of "some problem" were delayed an additional two
or three minutes answering questions or producing documents.
74) .

(T-

All the motorists inconvenienced by this roadblock were

delayed far longer than those stopped at any of the roadblocks
sustained in other jurisdictions.

However, appellant contends

that the length of time of the seizure is not the most important
factor.

4

The decision does not indicate whether or not there was
explicit legislative authority for checkpoints in Michigan.
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There

is

a

significant

intrusion

upon

privacy

when

a

law

enforcement officer stops a vehicle, identifies the occupants and
demands to know their destination.

Although, this court has

noted the citizen's right to refuse to answer, few people are
aware

of

that

right

or

have

the

courage

to

assert

it,

particularly when they perceive that their freedom to continue on
their way is at risk.
The most flagrant deficiency in the planning and operation
of this

roadblock

was

the

lack

of

imposed by policy making officials.

regulations

and

standards

Davis and Wallentine, supra,

state:
The restraint of subjectivity by officers
in roadblocks is critical. Nearly every case
assessing
the
constitutionality
of a
roadblock addresses the "neutral target
criteria" aspect of the roadblock operation,
and bases the decision on the presence and
comprehensiveness of the operational formula
designed to promote objectivity.
3 BYU J. PUB. L. at 379.

Sergeant Mangelson devised his own plan

which he submitted to his immediate supervisor, a lieutenant who
is a section commander in the field.5

5

This is hardly the

Sergeant Mangelson ordinarily supervised four troopers.
His supervisor, Lieutenant Utley, supervised three sergeants in
his "zone" which was comprised of two counties, Juab and Utah.
Above the Lieutenant in the chain of command were a captain, an
assistant superintendent and the Superintendent of the Highway
Patrol. (T-38-40) .
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involvement by policy level officers, who might be expected to
have a greater concern about the roadblock's intrusion on liberty
and privacy and the imposition upon the time of citizens and
voters, called for by the cases.
291 N.W.2d
making

314, 318

See, e.g., State v. Hilleshiem.

(Iowa 1980)

administrators

of

the

(pre-determination

time, location

and

by policy

procedures);

Little v. State. 497 A.2d 903, 911 (Md. 1984) (field officers
discretion

carefully

circumscribed

by

regulations

previously

established by high level administrative officials) ; Commonwealth
v. McGeocrhecran. 449 N.E.2d

349, 353

(Mass. 1983)

(pre-arranged

plan established by supervisory staff is essential); State v.
Martin. 496 A. 2d 442, 448 (Vt. 1985) (clear objective guidelines
established by high level administrative officials).
As argued, supra. the legislature should make the decision
in the first instance as to when, why and how roadblocks are to
be used if they are not precluded by the state constitution.
But, failing that, the Highway Patrol should establish standards
and criteria which circumscribe the discretion of the officers in
the

field.

This

analogous

question

containers

during

court
of
an

required

whether
otherwise

to

no

less

permit

valid

vehicle whose driver has been arrested.

in

resolving

officers

inventory

search

open
of

a

In State v. Shamblin. 94

Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Ct. App. 1988), this court held that
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to

the

containers
vehicle

could

only

be

opened

during

an

inventory

search

of

a

if the opening of containers was mandated by a

specific departmental procedure.
Furthermore, Sergeant Mangelson's self-devised plan was not
always followed.

While all non-commercial vehicles were directed

into the coned-off lane to wait to be interrogated, according to
the unrefuted testimony of Mr. Burke, not all drivers were asked
to produce documents.

He observed the officers waive through

older couples without checking documents.
It

is

often

remarked

in

(T-68).

justification

of

imposing

the

exclusionary rule, that its purpose is not to protect the guilty
who are before the court but the innocent whose rights might have
been

similarly

imposed

upon

without

incriminating

result.

Apparently, appellant and his passenger and, perhaps, two others
cited

for Marijuana possession, were the only ones found with

contraband at this roadblock, but hundreds if not thousands of
persons were inconvenienced

and had their liberty and privacy

infringed for no other reason than that they were traveling on an
interstate

highway

during

a time when Sergeant Mangelson was

teaching other officers "techniques of getting into vehicles".
(T-6).
If this court is to find roadblocks to be permissible
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without statutory authority, it should at least mandate that the
decision to conduct such roadblocks be made at the highest level
of the executive department and that standards and regulations
for the conducting roadblocks be promulgated which minimize as
far as possible the intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the traveling public.

Since that was not done in

the instant case, this court should find the initial seizure and
resulting searches unconstitutional.
POINT IV: REGARDLESS OF THE LEGALITY OF THE
ROADBLOCK AND THE INITIAL SEARCH, THE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S LUGGAGE
VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
After

the

small

amount

of

Marijuana

and

the

vial

of

suspected cocaine had been discovered, and after appellant and
Mr. Burke had been placed under arrest and handcuffed, Sergeant
Mangelson and Patrolman Lloyd continued to search the vehicle,
including suitcases that were in the back of the Blazer one of
which, when opened, revealed the twenty-seven ounces of cocaine.
(T-13).
In the district court, appellant sought to suppress this
evidence, regardless of the legality of the initial seizure at
the roadblock on the grounds that the search of the suitcases
without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and Section 14,
Article I of the Constitution of Utah.
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See, Memorandum in

Support of Motion to Suppress, 6-9 (R-14, 19-22).
The Utah Supreme Court has since clarified the law with
respect

to

the

application

of

the

warrant

requirement

to

automobile searches by interpreting the Section 14, Article I,
Constitution of Utah independently of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States making it unnecessary to analyze the confusing and
conflicting federal cases on the subject on this appeal.

Justice

Durham, in State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 23 (May 30,
1990), states:
The Supreme Court's Chambers-throughCarney line of cases cannot be squared with
the oft-stated principle that warrants-whenpracticable is the best policy. 3 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure §7.2(b), at 35.
These
cases expand the automobile exception by
ignoring the mobility factor and implementing
the rationale of diminished expectation of
privacy. This expansion and the vacillation
between
the warrant approach
and
the
reasonableness approach have resulted in
significant confusion about federal search
and seizure law regarding automobiles.

The . time has come for this court, in
applying an automobile exception to the
warrant requirement of article I, section 14
of the Utah Constitution, to try to simplify,
if possible, the search and seizure rules so
that they can be more easily followed by the
police and the courts, and, at the same time,
provide the public with consistent and
predictable protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
This can be
accomplished by eliminating some of the
confusing exceptions to the warrant
38

r e qu i rement t ha t h a v e bee n d e ve 1 oped b y
federal law in recent years. See id.
Specifically, this court will continue to use
the concept of expectation of privacy as a
suitable threshold criterion for determining
whether article I, section 14 is applicable.
Then if article I, section 14 applies,
warrantless searches will be permitted only
where
they
satisfy
their
traditional
justification, namely, to protect the safety
of police or public or to prevent the
destruction of evidence. See id. ; see also,
£•3* / Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
762-63 {] 969) ,
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6

While Justice Stewart concurred
without stating his views, his view as
decisions i n other cases is that, under
warrants are required unless an exception
State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13,
1990).
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fl

The

in result" in Larocco
expressed in his own
the "Fourth Amendment,
is shown. See, e.g.,
15 (Sup. Ct. June 28,

remaining question is were there circumstances which justified an
exception to the warrant requirement of Section 14, Article I.
As Justice Durham in Larocco, supra, said:
The next step requires justification of
the warrantless search by showing either
that the procurement of a warrant would have
jeopardized
the safety of the
police
officers or that the evidence was likely to
have been lost or destroyed.
In the instant case the appellant and his passenger, while
still at the scene, were handcuffed and in the custody of other
officers.

There was a total of thirty-five officers available

in the immediate area.

If there was a possible danger that the

prisoners might break away, open the back of the vehicle and open
a suitcase while handcuffed to obtain a weapon or somehow destroy
the cocaine, which seems difficult to imagine, they could have
been easily removed from the scene.
The Larocco, decision quoted State v. Hygh, 711 P. 2d 264,
272 (Utah 1985) (J. Zimmerman concurring), as follows:
Once the threat that the suspect will
injure the officers with concealed weapons or
will destroy evidence is gone, there is no
persuasive reason why the officers cannot
take the time to secure a warrant.
Such a
requirement would present little impediment
to police investigations, especially in light
of the ease with which warrants can be
obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant
statute, U.C.A., 1953, §7-23-4(2)(1982 ed.).
40

135 Utah Adv. Rep, at 23.

The Larocco decision also affirmed

that the burden of showing exigent
state.

135 Utah Adv. Rep, at 24.

circumstances

is upon the

In the instant case the state

clearly failed to show that the delay which might have resulted
if a warrant had been sought would have endangered the officers
or the evidence.
The only other exception to the warrant requirement which
might be argued

is the impound inventory exception.

v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985).
made

at the hearing

inventory search.7

See, State

However, no claim was

that the search of the suitcases was an
Furthermore, this court has previously held

that the opening of containers during a valid inventory search is
prohibited fay the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in the absence of standardized, departmental
regulations mandating the opening of all containers in inventory
searches.

State v. Shamblin, 9 4 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Ct. App.

1988) .
Since /the state has fai led. to prove any facts supporting an
exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence seized from

7

There was an initial claim that the small vial
containing Marijuana "roaches" which was found in an even later
search was found in an inventory search.
(T-14).
However, on
cross-examination the officer conceded it was a "plain search
search" rather than an inventory search.
(T-16).
This later
search at the impound lot was also Illegal of course.
41

the appellant's suitcase should have been suppressed regardless
of the legality of the initial detention and prior search of the
vehicle.
CONCLUSION
Since the conviction in this case was based solely upon
evidence which

was

seized

in the

course of

searches which

violated appellants rights secured by Section 14, Article I of
the Constitution of Utah and the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, this court should reverse the judgment and
sentence of the district court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

£*/// day of August, 1990.
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